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Abstract: This paper evaluates the short-run impact of the introduction of a stat-
utory minimum wage in Germany on the hourly wages and monthly earnings of
workers targeted by the reform. We first provide detailed descriptive evidence
of changes to the wage structure in particular at the bottom of the distribution
and distinguish between trends for regularly employed and marginally employed
workers. In the causal analysis, we then employ a differential trend adjusted
difference-in-differences (DTADD) strategy to identify the extent to which these
changes in wages and earnings can be attributed to the minimum wage intro-
duction. We find that the minimum wage introduction can account for hourly
wage growth in the order of roughly 6.5% or e0.45/hour and an increase in
monthly earnings of 6.6% ore53/month. Despite finding wage growth at the bot-
tom of the distribution, the paper documents widespread non-compliance with
the mandated wage floor ofe8.50/hour.
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1 Introduction
On January 1st, 2015, a coalition government in Germany introduced the country’s
first national statutory minimum wage in history. In contrast to most evaluation
studies that exploit marginal changes in the existing minimum wage laws in the
United States or other countries, the German case study proves particularly inter-
esting because it represents a high-impact, binding minimum-wage introduction
with a large share of the population affected. With incremental changes, identi-
fication of effects has found mixed results, thus, yielding substantial uncertainty
for the derivation of out-of-sample predictions with regard to this highly topical
policy tool. This challenge is particularly problematic in light of the fact that sub-
stantial increases or new introductions of minimum wages have found their way
into current debates in several countries (e.g. the US). Against this background,
the German reform offers a unique opportunity to more clearly establish causal-
ity and contribute to the broader debate in Germany and around the world. The
primary goal of the reform, which set a wage floor of e8.50 in all regions and
economic sectors with few exceptions, was to increase gross hourly wages for
low-wage workers. Against this background, this paper investigates the follow-
ing two questions. Firstly, how did the introduction of the German minimum wage
impact the distribution of hourly wages in the economy? Secondly, how do these
effects differ across pay groups and worker types? Our causal analysis focuses on
the short-run effects of the reform: the available data allow for the identification
of changes to the wage distribution through mid-2016.
Due to the recency of its introduction, very few studies have investigated
the impact of the statutory minimum wage reform in Germany on the wage and
earnings distribution in a causal fashion using data from the post-reform period.
Such studies include Bellmann et al. (2017), Caliendo et al. (2017) and Pusch
and Seifert (2017). Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel for the state
of Saxony, Bellmann et al. (2017) find a strong, positive effect of the reform on
gross monthly earnings, not only for workers earning below e8.50 prior to the
reform, but also for workers previously earning slightly above this threshold,
an indication of “spillover effects". Caliendo et al. (2017) identify the impact
of the reform on different segments of the wage and earnings distribution by
exploiting the variation in the intensity, or ‘bite’ across German regions (Raum-
ordnungsregionen). On the basis of data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
through 2015, they document above-average growth rates for wages in the bot-
tom tail of the distribution as well as higher growth rates in the bottom segments
in regions with a larger minimum wage bite. Moreover, these results as well as
recent work by Burauel et al. (2017), Mindestlohnkommission (2016) and Pusch
and Seifert (2017) demonstrate that a meaningful share of workers still receive
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pay below the mandated wage floor also after the reform, constituting evidence
of non-compliance.1
The present paper belongs to the first wave of evaluations using post-reform
data and builds on these studies mentioned above by providing descriptive as
well as causal evidence of wage changes around the time of, or on account of,
the minimum wage. Our results also offer evidence regarding the distributional
effects of the minimum wage which, with the exception of ex-ante evaluation
studies, has been scarce.
Beyond the German context, a large literature has grappled with the dis-
tributional effects of minimum wages. In one of the earliest papers to address
this question, DiNardo et al. (1996) study the importance of several institutional
factors such as the decline in union coverage and the real minimum wage for
explaining hourly wage inequalities in the United States. Using CPS data, they
attribute 25% of inequality growth among men and 30% of inequality growth
among women to the decreasing real value of the minimum wage over time. Lee
(1999) likewise investigates the relationship between the real minimumwage and
wage inequality using CPS data and corroborates this result. More recent papers
by Autor et al. (2008) and Autor et al. (2016), however, attribute amuch larger role
to market factors such as skill-biased technological change rather than minimum
wages in explaining wage inequality. Nevertheless, Autor et al. (2008) find that,
in particular for women in the lower tail of the distribution, the intertemporal
decline in the real minimum wage contributed meaningfully to wage inequality.
Going beyond effects on the hourly price of labor (wages) and using the same
data as these above mentioned studies, Neumark et al. (2004) explore several
channels of minimum wage effects, including monthly earnings, employment
probability and hours worked in addition to hourly wages. The authors find the
largest increases to hourly wages in the bottom tail of the distribution, but they
show that subsequent reductions in the hours worked and employment oppor-
tunities counteract the positive wage effect. Allowing for lagged responses to the
minimum wage, they moreover find that the overall effect on monthly earnings
becomes negative for low-wage workers. With the exception of some of the very
recent substantial state hikes in minimumwages, minimumwage adjustments in
the long history of the US minimum wage have predominantly been small and
incremental in comparison to the bite of the German statutory minimum wage.
In Great Britain, where a national statutory minimum wage was introduced
in 1998, several studies assess its impact on the wage and earnings distribution.
Manning (2013), LowPay Commission (2015, 2016) provide overviews of thiswork.
1 See Caliendo et al. (2019) for a general overview of the causal effects of the minimum wage
introduction on a large set of outcome variables.
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Using several different data sources,2 these studies predominantly conclude that
the British minimum wage decreased wage inequality at the lower tail of the dis-
tribution (see for example Dickens/Manning 2004; Dolton et al. 2012; Butcher
et al. 2012).
The institutional setting, design and bite of minimum wage reforms as well
as the pre-reform wage distribution differ greatly from country to country and are
likely to influence the effect of reforms in the United States, Great Britain and Ger-
many. Moreover, the spectrum of measured compliance – the degree to which a
wage floor is actually enforced – varies substantially across countries and groups
of workers as well as over time. Furthermore, measured compliance rates differ
depending on whether the data employed in the analysis is based on statements
from employees or employers. Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) calculate differences
as large as 13 percentage points. Metcalf (2008) arrives at similar results. Previ-
ous literature has established different non-compliance rates across groups of
workers, with larger rates among workers in low-wage sectors and those with
immigrant backgrounds (Cortes, 2004; Weil, 2005). Using rich survey data from
the Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP), we are able to quantify the degree of
non-compliance with the German minimum wage on average as well as across
different types of workers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
background to the timeline and eligibility rules of the reform. Section 3 describes
the data used in the analysis and introduces the econometric method applied to
identify causal effects of the reform. Section 4 offers a detailed analysis of trends
in wages and salary earnings at the mean as well as separately for the bottom
wage segments. Section 5.1 presents the results for the entire samplewhile Section
5.2 examines heterogeneous treatment effects for individuals in socially insured
regular employment and themarginally employed separately. Section 5.3 tests the
robustness of our results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background
Following years of debating the introduction of a minimum wage in Germany,
the debate became more concrete during the Federal elections in September
2013 and even more so by the end of November of that same year when an
emerging Grand Coalition government announced the intention to implement
a national, statutory minimum wage of e8.50 per hour effective January 1,
2 These include the Labor Force Survey, the New Earnings Survey, General Household Survey,
British Household Panel Survey and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
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2015. The German parliament passed the proposal into law by July 2014. Prior
to this implementation, minimum wages existed only at the sectoral level and
differed fundamentally from the statutory wage floor in that previous minimum
wages were negotiated by employers’ associations and unions.3 The new e8.50
minimum wage applied almost universally across all regions and sectors, with
few exclusions. Exempted groups include: trainees, most interns, the long-term
unemployed during the first 6 months of employment, and minors prior to com-
pleting vocational training. Moreover, sectors with their own bargainedminimum
wages received a temporary exemption until the end of 2017, at which time all sec-
tors were to be integrated into the national minimum wage regime. Nevertheless,
very few sectoral minimum wages fell below the national minimum.
3 Methodology
3.1 Data and sample restrictions
Nationally representative data from the 2010 to 2016 waves of the Socio-economic
Panel (SOEP) form the basis for our analysis. The SOEP is a panel survey con-
ducted annually in Germany since 1984 and contains about 15,000 households
(Goebel et al., 2018). It surveys households regarding their composition, income
and relevant employment information, including gross monthly earnings and
working hours. Individual hourly wages and gross monthly earnings form the
central outcome variables of interest in the present analysis. Although the SOEP
does not ask respondents their hourly wage directly, it can be calculated as
the quotient of two variables ascertained in the survey, namely monthly earn-
ings and usual weekly hours worked, with the denominator multiplied by 4.33
weeks/month.4
Because the field interviews predominantly end in the first half of the year,
this time frame enables us to study pre-reform trends, anticipation effects and
two years of post-reform effects. Furthermore, the survey asks respondents about
their contractual as well as actual hours worked by asking them to report paid
3 Fitzenberger and Doerr (2016) provide an overview of these sectoral minimum wages. Due to
their nature as negotiated wage floors, the sectoral minimum wages are not comparable to the
mandated, statutory minimum.
4 Respondents are asked to disregard additional payments and fringe benefits such as vacation
or Christmas money or a 13th/14th salary in the calculation of their monthly earnings. While
legal precedence has determined that employers may include these payments in the basis for
the minimum wage, these payments play only a minor role in the low wage sector, which is of
primary concern in this paper.
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and unpaid hours usually worked in their main job.5 This information allows
us to investigate the possible adjustment channel of increased unpaid overtime
work. In the following, we refer to the sum of paid and unpaid hours as ’actual
hours worked’ and the number of paid hours as ’contractual hours worked’, the
latter of which presents the primary measure for analysis, as it is less prone to
measurement error.6
The SOEP consists of several subsamples that together (weighted) represent
the entire population. In this paper, we utilize both the cross-sectional and lon-
gitudinal samples, as they possess different, complementary advantages. Central
parameters representative of the entire population are constructed using the
cross-sectional sample and weights. The measurement of individual changes in
hourly wages and monthly earnings, however, requires that individuals were
present and employed in at least two consecutive SOEPwaves. Thus, for this latter
analysis, we employ the panel sample and weights. Together, these two samples
enable us to paint a full picture of the minimum wage effects. The following
Table 1 summarizes the sample restrictions applied throughout the paper.
Table 1: Sample size by survey year.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Employed 16,155 18,199 16,066 15,822 14,895 81,137
Hourly wage undefined –3,734 –4,236 –3,392 –3,553 –3,445 –18,360
Exempt from minimum wage or –2,522 –2,904 –2,458 –2,727 –2,447 –13,058
has sector-specific minimum
wage
Cross-Sectional Sample 9,899 11,059 10,216 9,542 9,003 49,719
Not observed in t + 2 –3,341 –4,026 –3,336 -/- -/- –29,248
Job loss –62 –51 –75 -/- -/- –188
Missing information –363 –279 –330 -/- -/- –972
2-Year Panel Sample 6,133 6,703 6,475 -/- -/- 19,311
Source: SOEP v33 2012-2016, own calculations.
5 Hours worked in secondary jobs are not included.
6 The ability to work fewer hours at a later time in the year in order to compensate for accumu-
lated overtime renders a clear determination of the number of unpaid overtime hours difficult for
some respondents. Moreover, previous research has found that, when asked about their hours
worked, employees tend to overestimate them (see for example Bound et al. 2001). Any meas-
urement error would persist both before and after the reform and should therefore not drive our
results. Nevertheless, unpaid hours are likely more susceptible to any measurement error than
contractual hours because contractual hours are made explicit in all employment contracts.
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On average, the SOEP contains about 16,000 annual observations of
employed individuals above the age of 18. This number includes both full-time
and part-time workers as well as the marginally employed and self-employed. We
exclude roughly 16 percent of these observations from the sample due to their
exemption status from the minimum wage, discussed in detail above. Making
these exclusions ensures that treatment and control groups defined in the causal
analysis remain comparable. The following analysis applies exclusively to this
sample of the population.7 The remaining 49,719 individuals form the sample
population for the cross-sectional analysis.
Building upon the cross-sectional sample, we construct the sample for the
longitudinal analysis, referred to subsequently as the panel sample. With a ref-
erence year in time t, the panel sample draws upon individual information from
the wave two periods later, in time t + 2. Therefore, the panel setting imposes
additional restrictions on the sample. Individuals must participate in at least two
SOEP waves that lie two years apart and make all necessary information avail-
able for the determination of hourly wages. Due to item non response and panel
attrition, only part of the cross-sectional sample fulfills these requirements.8
The panel focus permits the evaluation of individual changes in hourly wages
or monthly earnings. In the following, we designate this sample the ‘two-year
panel’. Analogously, we create a ‘one-year panel’ consisting of individuals who
make available the necessary information in periods t and t+1. For the analysis of
wage changes due to the minimum wage reform, the two year panel is preferred
because it can better capture the effects of lagged implementation. Nevertheless,
for completeness we also provide estimates for the one-year panel.
3.2 Econometric specification
In order to distinguish a causal effect of the minimum wage introduction from
secular wage trends that would have developed even absent the reform, we
employ a differential trend adjusted difference-in-differences strategy (DTADD)
(Blundell/Dias 2009). A difference-in-differences (DD) strategy would not suf-
fice because hourly wages of low-wage workers do not exhibit a parallel trend9
with any control group and, thus, such estimates would prove biased. For the
DTADD strategy, average individual wage growth of the treatment and control
7 Individuals with sector-specific minimum wages are excluded from the analysis.
8 At the time of writing this study, the period of observation ends in 2016. Therefore, there are
no observations in t + 2 for the years 2015 and 2016.
9 The dynamic of individual wages generally decreases with the hourly wage percentile.
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group forms the foundation for the analysis. We define the treatment group as
individuals earning below e8.50/hour and the control group as individuals with
an hourly wage just above thewage floor, betweene8.50 and less thane10.00 per
hour. As we focus on low-wage earners, we truncate the control group at e10.00
to ensure comparability between the treatment and control group. wit+2 – wit rep-
resents the average individual wage growth of group i between two years, t ∈
{2012, 2014}, where i refers to either the treatment group (i = T) or the control
group (i = C). Then the DTADD estimator of the minimum wage effects can be
expressed as follows:
[(wT2016 – wT2014) – (wT2014 – wT2012)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observed
– [(wC2016 – wC2014) – (wC2014 – wC2012)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Counterfactual
(1)
The first difference of the DTADD estimator is defined through the four terms of
the group-specific average individual wage growth between time t and t + 2 in the
parentheses: (wT2016 – wT2014), (wT2014 – wT2012), (wC2016 – wC2014), and (wC2014 – wC2012).
The second difference is then calculated within each group, such that it depicts
the difference between the time period of the minimum wage implementation
and the previous period for the observed scenario and the counterfactual scen-
ario: (wT2016 – wT2014)– (wT2014 – wT2012) and (wC2016 – wC2014)– (wC2014 – wC2012). The third
difference is the difference between the “observed” scenario and the “counterfac-
tual” scenario. The observed (counterfactual) scenario summarizes the change in
average two-year wage growth in the treatment group (control group) between
2012–2014 and 2014–2016.
If, for instance, hourly wages in the treatment group increased on average by
e0.2 between 2012 and 2014, but bye0.5 between 2014 and 2016, wage growth in
the treatment group would then lie e0.3 higher in the period between 2014 and
2016 than in the period before. However, one could not exclude the possibility that
business cycle effects stemming from Germany’s economic growth during that
time positively influenced wage growth between 2014 and 2016. For this reason, it
is essential to employ a counterfactual situation that captures how wage growth
would have evolved absent the reform. For this purpose, we include the change in
wage growth of the control group. Our method relies on the assumption that any
changes observed for wage growth in the control group also would have occurred
in the treatment group had the reform not taken place. If, for example, average
wage growth in this group between 2014 and 2016 surpassed that in the previous
period (2012 to 2014) by e0.1, only e0.2 and not e0.3 could be ascribed to the
introduction of the minimum wage. The difference between changes in growth in
the treatment group and the changes observed in the control group present the
treatment effect of interest.
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In contrast to the DD analysis, this identification strategy does not require
the common trend assumption to hold. Rather, it modifies this assumption to
stating that existing differences between the treatment and control group would
have remained unchanged on average over time. The assumption requires that
business cycle effects equally impact the treatment and control group between
2012–2014 and 2014–2016. Given the consistently strong business cycle during
these years, this assumption likely holds.10 A further threat to identification could
arise if the control group is affected by the minimumwage. Previous studies have
established the existence of such “spillover” effects in the United States and Ger-
many for earlier reforms, at least in the long run (Lee 1999; Neumark et al. 2004;
Dickens/Manning 2004; Aretz/Gregory 2013, Autor et al. 2016). Data from the IAB
Establishment Panel suggest that also for the statutory minimum wage reform,
effects on wages may have also spilled over to higher segments of the wage distri-
bution already in the short run (Mindestlohnkommission, 2016). For this reason,
Section 5.3 tests the validity of this assumption and does not find evidence of any
significant spillover effects.
To illustrate the identification strategy applied in this paper, Table 2 provides
descriptive statistics of wage growth for the treatment and control groups. The
sample includes only observations present and employed in both t and t+2. Panel
A summarizes the available number of observations used in the later analysis.
Panel B displays the average absolute change in hourly wages. Panel C supple-
ments this information with the relative change in wage dynamics, defined as
ln(wit+2wit ) ∗ 100. This last panel allows for an evaluation of wage effects relative
to the initial value (wit) at the individual level. Columns (1)–(3) present these
values for the period used for the identification of treatment effects of the min-
imum wage introduction. Columns (4)–(6) demonstrate the critical identification
assumption of time-constant differences between the treatment and control group
by providing the same values for earlier periods.
Table 2 shows an average increase in hourly wages of e2.70 among individu-
als who earned belowe8.50 in 2014 and remained employed in 2016 (see Column
(1) of panel B). In the same period, average hourly wages of the control group
rose by approximately e1.40. Such differences, however, also existed in the pre-
vious period from 2012 to 2014: the treatment group experienced wage growth in
the order of e0.60 higher than that of the control group (e2.10–e1.50). Due to
this systematic difference in wage growth trends, a simple DD estimator would
yield biased results. The DTADD approach accounts for the above-described dif-
ferences in wage dynamics of individuals earning above and below e8.50 prior
10 According to the German Statistical Office, GDP per capita increased by 5.8% between 2012
and 2014 and by 5.7% between 2014 and 2016.
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Table 2: Average growth in contractual hourly wages.
DTADD Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014/16 2012/14 Difference 2012/14 2010/12 Difference
(1)–(2) (4)–(5)
Panel A: Observations
Wage<8.50 545 549 549 533
8.50 ≤Wage < 10 438 412 412 397
Panel B: Absolute
Change (in Euro)
Wage<8.50 2.7 2.1 0.6 2.1 2.0 0.1
(3.8) (3.9) (3.9) (3.3)
8.50 ≤Wage < 10 1.4 1.5 –0.1 1.5 1.1 0.4
(3.5) (3.2) (3.2) (2.4)
DTADD 0.7* –0.3
Panel C: Log Change
(×100)
Wage<8.50 28.8 22.5 6.3 22.5 22.0 0.5
(33.8) (35.8) (35.8) (32.8)
8.50 ≤Wage < 10 10.5 11.6 –1.1 11.6 8.6 3.0
(26.0) (23.7) (23.7) (22.5)
DTADD 7.4*** –2.5
Source: SOEP v33 2010-2016, own calculations. Results are based on contractual hourly wages
and are Unweighted. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
to the reform. Controlling for the counterfactual scenario, the true difference
becomes:
(2.70 – 2.10)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observed
– (1.40 – 1.50)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Counterfactual
≈ 0.70 (2)
To place this effect in relation to the individual, pre-reform wage level, we con-
sider the logged change in panel C, which indicates a relative change of 7.4
percentage points additional wage growth between 2014 and 2016 due to the min-
imum wage introduction. With a mean hourly wage of e6.90 in the treatment
group during the initial period, this difference equates to e0.50 extra per hour
(6.90 × 0.074) in comparison to the control group.
To complete the analysis of the causal effect of the minimum wage reform on
hourly wages, we use regression analysis to additionally control for differential
characteristics of the treatment and control group that likewise influence hourly
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wages, independently of the minimumwage reform. The regression equation can
be stated as follows:
Bwit = "0 + "1Tit + "′2Yit + "′3Tit × Yit + "′4Xit + "′5Changeit + %i,t (3)
Bwit captures the individual hourly wage change from time t to t + 2. Tit repres-
ents the treatment indicator that takes the value of one if the individual earned
less than e8.50 per hour in period t and zero otherwise. "1, therefore, represents
the average wage growth of individuals who earned less than e8.50 in time t.
Interacting this term with the time vector Yit demonstrates whether significant
deviations from the average growth, "1, occurred in any specific year. As such, the
coefficient of interest, "3, identifies for Yit = 2014 wage changes attributable to
the minimum wage. Individual characteristics captured by Xit include: age, sex,
marital status, citizenship status, highest educational attainment level, place of
residence and the number of children under the age of 16 living in the household.
Additionally, the following employment characteristics enter into the regression
in the form of dummy variables: part-time employment, time-limited contract,
firm size and economic sector. Changeit further contains information regarding
whether the individual changed employment characteristics between periods t
and t + 2, including: eligibility for the minimum wage, job change, receiving a
permanent contract, firm size and sector. %it is an idiosyncratic error term. We
estimate the regression equation with OLS. Results are presented in Section 5.
4 Trends in wages and salary earnings
4.1 Wage growth throughout the distribution
Before turning our attention to the causal analysis, this section describes trends in
gross hourly wages before and after the minimum wage reform. Table 3 presents
descriptive statistics for the central variables of the cross-sectional analysis in
each year between 2012 and 2016. Among the population of employees eligible
for the minimum wage, mean gross monthly earnings amount to e2,620 in 2012
and e2,850 in 2016 in unadjusted nominal terms. Dividing the monthly income
by usual (contractual) monthly hours worked, we arrive at our working concept of
hourly wages, which increase between 2012 and 2016 from approximatelye17.2 to
e18.7. Because actual hours worked surpass contractual hours, the use of contrac-
tual hours yields a significantly higher hourly wage. However, this observation is
valid also for the pre-reform period.
A look at the evolution of contractual wages in Germany during the past dec-
ades helps to understand the role of the minimum wage introduction for the
212 P. Burauel et al.
Table 3: Earnings, working hours and hourly wage – by year.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Monthly Gross Earnings 2,622.77 2,649.42 2,703.05 2,818.06 2,846.49
in Euros (1,534.92) (1,577.11) (1,639.14) (1,684.00) (1,685.27)
Weekly Hours Worked 34.18 34,10 33,75 34,03 33.98
Contractual (9.81) (9,64) (9,96) (9,78) (9.77)
Actual 37.76 37.58 36.98 37.17 37.11
(11.72) (11.65) (11.81) (11.59) (11.51)
Hourly Wage in Euros 17.22 17.41 17.88 18.54 18.74
Contractual (8.51) (8.72) (9.06) (9.25) (9.24)
Actual 15.58 15.8 16.28 17.00 17.16
(7.22) (7.52) (7.80) (8.05) (8.06)
Observations 9,899 11,059 10,216 9,542 9,003
Source: SOEP v33 2012–2016, own calculations. The table shows weighted averages based on
the cross-sectional sample; standard deviations in parentheses.
evolution of wages immediately following the reform. Figure 1 exhibits growth
rates in decile-specific average contractual hourlywages throughout thewage dis-
tribution for two-year changes between 1998 and 2016. We denote these growth
rates ‘anonymized growth rates’ because this procedure measures growth not at
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Source: SOEP v33, panel sample, own calculations.
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the individual level, but rather based on decile-specific averages, which may be
comprised of a different pool of people from one year to the next.
The light-grey, dashed lines show the growth rates based on the two years’
difference during the pre-reform period. The black dashed line represents the
average over these years before the minimumwage introduction. The black, solid
line shows the two year difference between 2014 and 2016. As such, Figure 1
shows that the correlation between wage decile and wage growth systematically
differs from the trend in the pre-reform period. The average pre-reform growth
rate lies at around 2.5%, with the upper wage deciles experiencing faster growth
at about 3.5% compared to the lower ones at below 2%. Between 2014 and
2016 in contrast, wage growth in the lower deciles lay well above the decile-
specific average of the past years, accelerating from a meager 1% average growth
to 15%. At the same time, wage growth in the higher deciles continued at
about the same rate after the reform compared to the average of the previous
years.
4.2 Changes in wage inequality
Concerns regarding growing wage inequality in Germany motivated support for
the minimum wage reform of 2015. For this reason, this section briefly discusses
the evolution of wage inequality both prior to and after the minimum wage intro-
duction. The mean log deviation (MLD) in wages serves as a standard measure
of inequality, which we also utilize here. Two advantages of MLD make it par-
ticularly appropriate for our analysis: it is especially sensitive to changes at the
bottom of the wage distribution where the minimum wage binds and it can be
decomposed into wage difference between and within groups (see for example
Cowell 2011). Table 4 displays the MLD for the entire cross-section. The first row
shows the lower and the third row the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval.
The second row contains the point estimate.
Table 4: Inequality in contractual gross hourly wages (MLD Coefficient).
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Lower Limit 0.111 0.112 0.116 0.113 0.106
Point Estimate 0.115 0.117 0.121 0.118 0.111
Upper Limit 0.120 0.121 0.125 0.122 0.116
Source: SOEP v33 2012–2016, cross-sectional sample, own calculations.
Results are weighted and lower and upper limits refer to a 95%
confidence interval using a bootstrapping procedure with 200 iterations.
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While inequality in the entire cross-sectional sample increased during the
period from 2012 to 2014, this trend reversed by 2015, in the year immediately
following the introduction of the minimum wage. Table 4 shows a statistically
significant reduction in inequality of average hourly wages in 2016 compared
to 2014 before the introduction of the minimum wage. This result should not be
interpreted as a causal effect of the minimum wage, as any number of factors
could have contributed to this evolution. Instead, results place the minimum
wage reform in the context of increasing wage inequality that began to decrease
during the same period as the minimum wage introduction. Section 5 builds on
this descriptive evidence by exploring a causal link between wage growth and
the reform.
4.3 Developments in the bottom wage segments
The previous section showed trends in average wages throughout Germany. This
section focuses on developments in the bottom 40% of the gross hourly wage dis-
tribution between 2012 and 2016. Figure 2 highlights these developments using
Pen’s Parade. This graphical concept first sorts all workers in the given year
according to their hourly wage, from lowest to highest. The next step entails plot-
ting the average wage in each percentile against each consecutive percentile of
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Figure 2: Pen’s parade of contractual and actual gross hourly wages in the bottom 40% of the
wage distribution.
Source: SOEP v33, cross-sectional sample, own calculations.
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workers. Plotting Pen’s Parade for between 2012 and 2016 together allows for a
comparison of wage growth over several years. Figure 2 shows Pen’s Parade for
workers earning in the bottom 40% of the hourly wage distribution.
The left-hand panel of Figure 2 depicts Pen’s Parade of average hourly wages
calculated on the basis of contractual hours worked and the right-hand panel the
corresponding rates on the basis of actual hours worked. The figure confirms and
shows in more detail the wage growth in the low-wage segments targeted by the
reform. In addition, the image quantifies the share of workers earning below the
minimum wage level of e8.50/hour in gross terms before and after the reform.
The horizontal line demarcates the wage floor. Whereas the share lying below
the red line amounts to 12% in both 2012 and 2014, it is reduced to 7% by 2016.
The nationally representative survey weights enable a conversion of this percent-
age into the number of employees – roughly 1.8 million – still earning below the
minimum wage after the first quarter of 2016. In 2015 this number amounted to
roughly 2.1 million, down from about 2.8 million prior to the reform. Measured
in actual rather than contractual hours worked, as displayed in the right-hand
panel, the share of non-compliance is higher, but the magnitude of the reduc-
tion from approximately 14.5% in 2012 and 2014 to 10% in 2016 shows a similar
pattern. Note that the sample only includes individuals eligible for the minimum
wage such that wages under e8.50 cannot be explained by exempted groups of
employees.
4.4 Individual wage growth
Following the cross-sectional analysis of changes in (anonymized) wages
throughout the distribution, this section utilizes the panel sample in order to
focus on changes to the wages of individuals who earned below the minimum
wage prior to the reform and remained employed after its introduction. Figure 3
illustrates these changes with a personalized wage growth curve. The personal-
ized wage growth curve describes the relationship between average individual
wage growth and the individual’s position in the wage distribution in the initial,
pre-reform period. Whereas a Pen’s Parade depicts how the wage, for example, in
the 30th percentile of the wage distribution in 2016 changed in comparison to the
wage at this percentile in 2014, the personalized curve describes the development
over time of the average wage of individuals who earned at the 30th percentile of
the wage distribution in 2014 (and in any percentile in 2016).
Like the anonymized (cross-sectional) wage growth curve in Figure 1, Figure 3
exhibits the change in wages from 2014 to 2016 as a solid, thick black line and
juxtaposes this growth to historical two-year changes in wages between 1998 and
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Figure 3: Personalized growth curves for gross hourly wages.
Source: SOEP v33, panel sample, own calculations.
2014. Light grey, dashed lines capture individual two-year changes and the thick
black dashed line the average of these between 1998 and 2014.
In the bottom decile of the wage distribution for each initial period, wages
grow by 30–40% and then sink to a rate under 20% by the second decile, indicat-
ing historically high growth rates of the average individual with the lowest wages
in the initial period. High growth rates at the bottom demonstrate that, for many
individuals, low wages represent a transitory phenomenon. Workers with wages
in the lowest decile tend to be young with short work biographies who then gain
human capital and work experience that subsequently promote them into higher
wage categories. From 2014 to 2016, growth at the bottom increased even further,
to about 50%.
4.5 Mobility between wage segments
This section examines the transitions of individuals across wage segments of the
distribution, as workers may occupy different positions throughout their working
biography. For this exercise, we use transition matrices to illustrate mobility. The
matrices describe the probability to transition from a wage segment in time t to
another segment in time t + 2, for instance from below the minimum wage to the
segment between thee8.50 wage floor ande10.50. In contrast to the wage curves
in Figures 1 and 3, the transition matrix also accounts for individuals switching
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Table 5: Transitions for contractual gross hourly wages (2012–2016).
Not Below EUR 8.50 EUR 10.50 Above EUR
Employed EUR 8.50 –10.50 –12.00 12.00
Wage Group in 2014
Wage Group in 2012
Not Employed 0.922 0.021 0.015 0.007 0.035
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Below EUR 8.50 0.274 0.379 0.198 0.078 0.07
(0.027) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.014)
EUR 8.50-10.50 0.137 0.073 0.369 0.185 0.236
(0.020) (0.015) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027)
EUR 10.50-12.00 0.132 0.011 0.069 0.314 0.474
(0.025) (0.004) (0.019) (0.042) (0.039)
Above EUR 12.00 0.093 0.006 0.01 0.013 0.879
(0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008)
Wage Group in 2016
Wage Group in 2014
Not Employed 0.930 0.011 0.015 0.005 0.039
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Below EUR 8.50 0.217 0.235 0.302 0.097 0.149
(0.026) (0.024) (0.030) (0.023) (0.027)
EUR 8.50-10.50 0.162 0.073 0.377 0.21 0.177
(0.025) (0.013) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023)
EUR 10.50-12.00 0.166 0.029 0.116 0.237 0.452
(0.032) (0.016) (0.021) (0.031) (0.037)
Above EUR 12.00 0.094 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.878
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Source: SOEP v33 2012-2016, panel sample. N = 14,538 in the sample 2012-2014 and
N = 14,398 in the sample 2014-2016. All probabilities stated in decimal value (0.285 = 28.5%).
Standard deviations in parentheses.
from employment to not working. Table 5 presents a transitionmatrix for contrac-
tual hourly wages in 2012/2014 and 2014/2016. We distinguish between four wage
segments as well as the transition out of employment and vice versa. We define
the following groups as non-employed: trainees and apprentices, those parti-
cipating in older worker part-time schemes (Altersteilzeit), but who report zero
hours, those in military or the civil social service, working in an establishment for
disabled people and those reporting non-employment.
Each row describes a certain wage group status in the initial period, 2012 for
the upper panel and 2014 for the lower panel. The columns represent the share of
each group that transitions from the given wage group to the wage group denoted
in the column title (each row adds up to one). The shares in the main diagonal
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correspond to the share of each wage segment that remained in that wage group
two years later. The table shows that the share of individuals that remained in
employment remunerated below the minimum wage level of e8.50 substantially
decreased after the introduction of the minimum wage: in the period from 2012
to 2014, 38% remained in this wage category, while from 2014 to 2016 the share
dropped to 24%. At the same time, a slightly smaller share of workers previously
earning below the minimum wage transitioned out of employment from 2014
to 2016 compared to 2012 to 2014 and a much larger share (30% compared to
20%) experienced upward wage mobility into a higher wage segment between
e8.50 and e10.50. It is also noteworthy that the share of workers paid below
the minimum wage in the previous period and who transitioned into an even
higher segment with an hourly wage above e12.00 doubled in 2014/2016 com-
pared to 2012/2014. Finally, the share of non-workers who remained out of work
slightly increased in 2014/2016 compared to 2012/2014. Moreover, transitions out
of employment from the wage segment just above the minimum wage between
e8.50-e10.50 aswell ase10.50-e12.00 increased from 14% to 16%and from 13%
to 17%, respectively.
The descriptive evidence provided in this section paints a clear picture: fol-
lowing many years of low wage growth at the bottom of the wage distribution,
the introduction of the statutory minimum wage is associated with significant
growth in wage dynamics in the bottom decile of the distribution.11 and, con-
sequently, a compression of the wage distribution. Nevertheless, compliance with
the minimum wage remains imperfect and many eligible workers still earn an
hourly wage below e8.50/hour. The following section addresses the question to
what extent the observed changes in wage growth can be causally attributed to
the minimum wage introduction.
5 Results of the causal effects analysis
5.1 Main results
Table 6 summarizes the results from the regression analysis for changes in con-
tractual hourly wages of all workers eligible for the minimum wage. In order to
control for non-linear relationships, the dependent variable is defined in logar-
ithmic rather than absolute terms. Therefore, coefficients should be interpreted
11 For the first wage decile, a t-test reveals a statistically significant difference (p < 0.001) in the
relative growth rate of contractual hourly wages in 2014-2016 in comparison to all other periods
(1998-2014). For the second decile, this difference is insignificant (p ≈ 0.12).
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Table 6:Minimum wage effect on relative wage growth.
One-Year Analysis Two-Year Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One-Year Analysis
Hourly wage < EUR 8.50 10.83*** 12.57*** 12.49***
(1.57) (1.59) (1.59)
× DTADD 2014–2015 4.01* 4.13* 3.96*
(2.14) (2.12) (2.11)
× Placebo 2012–2013 –2.21 –1.5 –1.42
(2.19) (2.17) (2.17)
Two-Year Analysis
Hourly wage < EUR 8.50 10.89*** 12.59*** 12.93***
(1.92) (1.95) (1.94)
× DTADD 2014–2016 7.44*** 6.75** 6.47**
(2.71) (2.68) (2.68)
× Placebo 2010–2012 2.49 2.29 2.07
(2.63) (2.61) (2.59)
Constant 6.62*** 13.44*** 7.31** 11.58*** 20.04*** 10.59***
(0.92) (2.77) (3.45) (1.17) (3.55) (4.09)
Control Variables
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Socio-demographic info. yes yes yes yes
Employment
characteristics
yes yes yes yes
Changes in yes yes
Employment
Observations 3,523 3,523 3,523 2,874 2,874 2,874
Adj. R2 0.043 0.081 0.085 0.056 0.087 0.098
Source: SOEP v33 2010-2016, own calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the individual level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
as percentage changes. In addition to showing results for the two-year changes,
(Columns (4)–(6)), Table 6 also provides results for one-year changes (Columns
(1)–(3)) in order to describe potential differences in the effects across the time
period following the reform. Columns (1) and (4) present results for the baseline
specification using only treatment indicators and year fixed effects as con-
trol variables. Columns (2) and (5) additionally include sociodemographic and
employment characteristic controls. Columns (3) and (6) also include controls for
changes in employment.
The first row of Table 6 quantifies the differential wage dynamics within the
one-year panel sample between treatment and control groups. According to the
one-year analysis, hourly wages of workers earning belowe8.50 grew on average
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by 10.83% faster than the control group (workers earninge8.50-e10.00) between
2012 and 2015. The introduction of the minimum wage further increased this
growth by about 4 percentage points, which is captured by the DTADD interac-
tion term for 2014–2015 in Column (1). This treatment effect can be considered
causal, is significant at the 90% confidence level and proves robust to the inclu-
sion of controls for sociodemographic and employment characteristics as well as
for changes in employment status. With a mean wage ofe6.90/hour for the treat-
ment group in 2014, the economic magnitude of the treatment effect amounts to
an additionale0.30/hour (e6.90 × 0.04) above and beyond the wage growth that
would have been expected absent theminimumwage introduction. An alternative
way to consider the effect offers insight into the issue of non-compliance with the
minimum wage: without the reform, hourly wages in the treatment group would
have been expected to grow by e0.90/hour (e6.9 × 0.125), reaching e7.80/hour
(e6.90 + e0.90). Instead, the minimum wage caused average wages in the treat-
ment group to rise to e8.10, which still falls, on average, below the legal wage
floor, indicating substantial non-compliance.
The two-year analysis shows that hourly wages of employees earning below
e8.50 continue to increase through the second quarter of 2016 and grow dynam-
ically in comparison to the control group. According to the two-year perspective,
the marginal treatment effect of the minimum wage introduction on hourly wage
growth is 6.47 percentage points in the preferred specification with full con-
trols, an even higher and statistically more significant impact than that found
in the one-year analysis. From the mean of e6.90/hour, this effect amounts to
e0.45/hour more than would have been the case absent the reform (e6.90 × 0.065
= e0.45). Even with this larger effect, however, the average hourly wage of the
treatment group fell shy of the e8.50 legal wage threshold at e8.24/hour (e6.90
+e0.89 +e0.45).
Finally, the third row of results for the one-year and two-year analyses lend
credence to the validity of the crucial identifying assumption for the DTADD
approach, namely time-persistent differences between treatment and control
groups. Specifically, the placebo test examines whether wages of the treatment
and control groups grew at different speeds during the period of 2012–2013 than
in 2013–2014. The observed differences prove statistically insignificant in all
specifications.
To answer the question of whether the minimum wage not only increased
hourly wages, but also the overall labor income position of the target group, it
becomes necessary to consider the effect on monthly earnings. After all, the goal
of the reform was not just to increase wages per hour, but rather to improve the
economic situation of low-income individuals. Monthly earnings combine two
possible dimensions of adjustment: hours worked and hourly wages. In a related
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contribution Burauel et al. (2019) demonstrate that the minimum wage introduc-
tion not only increased wages, but also had a negative impact on average hours
worked. Therefore, in the following, we investigate the net effect of these two
opposing forces. Table 7 depicts the results of the DTADD estimation from eq. (3)
where the change in gross monthly earnings replaces the change in wages as the
dependent variable.
The one-year analysis of Table 7 reveals that the effect of the minimum wage
on the gross monthly earnings of the treatment group could not be statistically
distinguished from zero. Similar to the results for changes in (log) wages, gross
monthly (log) earnings experienced a higher growth rate in the treatment group
than in the control group during the period under investigation (2012–2015): the
first row of the first two columns indicates that earnings grew by roughly 10.5%
more in the treatment than in the control group. The minimum wage, however,
did not affect this relationship. Although the minimum wage led to a rise in
Table 7:Minimum wage effect on relative gross monthly earnings.
One-Year Two-Year
Analysis Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hourly wage < EUR 8,50 10.98*** 10.54*** 8.91*** 8.24***
(1.91) (1.90) (2.42) (2.42)
× DTADD 2014–2015 1.39 1.09
(2.69) (2.63)
× DTADD 2014–2016 8.70** 6.58*
(3.54) (3.40)
× Placebo 2012–2013 –4.45 –3.63
(2.71) (2.64)
× Placebo 2010–2012 4.15 3.08
(3.53) (3.46)
Constant 7.79*** 17.68*** 12.69*** 11.63**
(1.25) (4.24) (1.57) (5.23)
Control Variables
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Sociodemographic information yes yes
Employment characteristics yes yes
Changes in employment yes yes
Observations 3,523 3,523 2,874 2,874
Adj. R2 0.022 0.071 0.027 0.122
Source: SOEP v33 2010–2016, own calculations. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the individual level. Significance levels: * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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hourly wages, it also lowered hours worked for this same group. In sum, the net
impact of the minimum wage on monthly earnings of the target group can not be
distinguished from zero in the one-year horizon.
5.2 Heterogeneity of effects by employment type
As argued in Burauel et al. (2018), one would expect the introduction of the min-
imum wage to differentially impact employees with socially insured positions
and the marginally employed. Marginally employed individuals have an incent-
ive to reduce their hours worked in order to remain below the threshold of e450
monthly, beyond which workers become subject to social security contributions.
Moreover, the wages of marginally employed workers lie well below those of the
regularly employed and, due to a lower skill level on average, generally have a
weaker positionwhen negotiatingwages with employers (see also Stegmaier et al.
2015). At the same time, the minimum wage is more likely to price these workers
out of themarket than the regularly employedwhen theirmarginal productivity of
labor falls below the wage floor. Garloff (2016), Schmitz (2017) and Caliendo et al.
(2018) show that, in fact, the minimumwage decreased the number of marginally
employed workers. Therefore, for this group, we also examine the wage and earn-
ings effects of the minimum wage for these two types of employment separately.
Figure 4 juxtaposes Pen’s Parade for the regularly employed (including both
part- and full-time) to that of themarginally employed. The upper panel considers
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Figure 4: Evolution of hourly wages and monthly earnings by employment type.
Source: SOEP v33, cross-sectional sample, own calculations.
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hourly wages and the lower panel describes gross monthly earnings. The hori-
zontal line in the upper panel denotes the minimum wage level. The figure
documents that remuneration below the minimum wage in 2016 is predomin-
antly a phenomenon of the marginally employed. While one observes an increase
in wages up to the 60th percentile of this group, roughly 40 percent of this pop-
ulation receives an hourly wage below the legal wage floor. The distribution of
hourly wages for the socially insured workers remains noticeably above that for
the marginally employed. As a consequence, the relative growth patterns from
2014 to 2016 compared to 2012–2014 shown in the upper panel of Figure 4 are
more pronounced for the marginally employed.
The lower panel of Figure 4 shows the evolution of monthly gross earnings for
the socially insured compared to the marginally employed workers between 2012
and 2016. The left panel reveals only a slight improvement for the socially insured
in terms of gross monthly earnings. For the marginally employed, in contrast, the
share of the group earning below the tax threshold of e450/month decreases by
10 percentage points: whereas in 2014, 70% of the marginally employed earned
within the limits of the tax preference, in 2016 only 60% did so.
Turning to the causal effects for regularly employed andmarginally employed
workers separately, Table 8 shows results based on the two-year panel sample.
The subgroup analysis further splits the sample of regularly employed individuals
into full- and part-time categories to examine potential heterogeneous treatment
effects.12 This further partition reduces the sample size and, thus, the power of
the separate regressions compared to using the full sample. Analogously to the
results of the full sample, the column titled “Hourly Wage < 8.50” reflects the
different wage dynamics between treatment and control groups. “DTADD 2014–
2016” identifies the change in hourly wage attributable to the minimum wage
introduction. “Placebo 2010–2012” tests the critical identification assumption for
the DTADD, namely whether wage differences between treatment and control
groups can be considered time-constant. All regressions consider the full set of
controls.
The differential analysis according to regular employment status reveals sub-
stantial heterogeneity in the treatment effect. During the period under investiga-
tion, wage growth was the most dynamic for the marginally employed, followed
by the part-time regularly employed, increasing 17.4% and 14.5%, respectively,
more in the treatment compared to the control group. In contrast, wage growth
for full-time employees in the treatment group surpassed that of the control group
by 10.7%. Despite the high growth rates of the part-time regularly employed, this
growth cannot be attributed to the minimum wage. For this group, the effect of
12 Full-time is defined as working more than 30 hours per week.
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the reform is negative, but statistically insignificant. The reform did, however,
positively impact hourly wages of full-time employees by 7.8 percentage points.
According to the subgroup analysis, the minimum wage introduction had the
largest, positive effect on the hourly wages of the marginally employed, who
experienced a growth rate 15.5 percentage points higher in the treatment than
in the control group. Finally, Panel B of Table 8 considers the net effect on gross
earnings, which results from changes in hourly wages and in hours worked, for
the socially insured and marginally employed separately. Despite positive treat-
ment effects on hourly wages of the marginally employed, the reduction in hours
worked counteracts the wage effect (compare Burauel et al., 2019). Neither for
socially insured nor for the marginally employed can any positive impact of the
minimum wage reform on gross monthly earnings be detected. At the same time,
partitioning workers into these categories renders the sample sizes smaller than
in the entire sample and the sample size may simply become too small to detect
an effect.
5.3 Robustness analysis - Spillover effects
As discussed in Section 3.2, the causal identification of the DTADD treatment
effect relies on the assumption that the introduction of the minimum wage did
not affect the selected control group. A priori, the direction of potential spillover
effects is unclear. On the one hand, rising wage costs in the lower segment of the
distribution could cause employers to decrease wages of higher earners in order
to pass along the additional costs of the reform. However, in reality, wages tend to
be sticky and long-term contracts as well as social norms may prevent employers
from doing so. Negative spillover effects in the form of wage compression tend to
be associated with new hires rather than the current stock of employees, render-
ing this type of spillover a predominantly long-term phenomenon. On the other
hand, wagesmay also rise for workers previously earning just above theminimum
wage if employers wish to retain the wage structure within their establishment.
Data from the IAB Establishment Panel Survey suggest this latter direction ismore
likely: 14 percent of all responding establishments report increasing wages not
only for those previously earning below the minimum, but also for those earning
above the mandated threshold (Mindestlohnkommission, 2016). The presence of
positive spillover effects would bias the estimates of wage growth downward if
the control group does not correctly reflect the counterfactual situation.
The existing literature finds that spillover effects appear mostly in groups
earning close to theminimumwage cutoff. For this reason, we test the existence of
possible spillover effects by comparing the results of our main specification from
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Table 6 with a robustness estimation in which we employ an alternative control
group consisting of workers earning betweene10.00 ande11.50 (while the defini-
tion of the original treatment group remains unchanged). If wages of our preferred
control group of employees earning betweene8.50 ande10.00 were not affected
by the reform, we should not observe changes in wage growth between the ori-
ginal control group and alternative control group. The validity of this approach
rests on the assumption that any potential spillover effects shrink as one moves
further away from the minimumwage cut-off toward higher segments of the wage
distribution. This assumption likely holds, as other studies have found that the
spillover effects in Germany were in fact small and decreasing in higher segments
of the wage distribution (Mindestlohnkommission, 2018; Caliendo et al., 2019).
Table 9 summarizes results for the one-year and two-year comparison and
demonstrates that results remain robust to this alternative control group. It
shows a positive and statistically significant treatment effect for the original
treatment group between 2014 and 2015 (Columns (1) and (2)). For the two-year
analysis, the treatment effect has a similar magnitude, although it loses its sig-
nificance (Columns (3) and (4)). Only a marginal difference exists in the general
wage dynamics between workers earning between e8.50-e10.00 and those earn-
ing between e10.00-e11.50. These differences, however, did not change during
the time period under investigation, neither for the one-year nor for the two-
year analysis (see “Spillover DTADD” and “Spillover Placebo”). These results
are furthermore robust to alternative definitions of the additional control group,
including individuals earning up to e13.00/hour. In conclusion, the robustness
test does not find any evidence of spillover effects in the short run for the German
minimum wage reform (2015–2016).
6 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we descriptively examine the evolution of the wage and earnings
structure of German workers around the time of the introduction of the min-
imum wage reform and causally identify the impact of the reform on the wage
and income distribution. The descriptive analyses illustrate an acceleration of
wage growth for workers earning below e8.50/hour after the introduction of
the wage floor in January 2015. In the bottom 10th percentile of the wage distri-
bution, wages increased by 15% between 2014 and 2015 despite a consistently
lower growth rate of below 2% in previous periods (1998–2014). Between 2014
and 2016, contractual and actual hourly wages of low wage workers experienced
above-average growth, not only with respect to previous periods, but also in com-
parison to high-wage earners. In line with this trend, the analysis further finds
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Table 9: Robustness: Spillover effects on contractual gross hourly wages.
Change in Contractual Hourly Wages
One-Year Two-Year
Analysis Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One-Year Analysis
Hourly wage < EUR 8,50 10.83*** 12.56***
(1.57) (1.58)
× DTADD 2014–2015 4.01* 4.00*
(2.14) (2.11)
× Placebo 2012–2013 –2.21 –1.45
(2.19) (2.17)
EUR 10 ≤Wage < EUR 11.50 –1.76 –2.93**
(1.43) (1.42)
× Spillover DTADD 2014–2015 –0.04 –0.02
(1.92) (1.88)
× Spillover Placebo 2012–2013 1.28 1.96
(1.95) (1.94)
Two-Year Analysis
Hourly wage < EUR 8,50 18.67*** 21.41***
(3.11) (3.10)
× DTADD 2014–2016 8.28* 6.48
(4.53) (4.44)
× Placebo 2010–2012 1.94 1.25
(4.10) (4.02)
EUR 10 ≤Wage < EUR 11.50 – 3.04 –2.9
(2.17) (2.22)
× Spillover DTADD 2014–2016 0.56 –0.91
(3.15) (3.16)
× Spillover Placebo 2010–2012 3.71 3.05
(2.88) (2.88)
Constant 7.16*** 6.94** 15.79*** 21.59***
(1.02) (2.88) (1.69) (4.71)
Control Variables
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Sociodemographic information yes yes
Employment characteristics yes yes
Changes in employment yes yes
Observations 4,927 4,927 4,036 4,036
Adj. R2 0.052 0.089 0.061 0.103
Source: SOEP v33 2010-2016, own calculations. DTADD regressions, robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the individual level with * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Results are
unweighted and based on the panel sample.
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reduction in mean log deviations of wages throughout the distribution from 2014
to 2016, indicating a compression in the overall wage distribution. Notwithstand-
ing above-average wage growth at the bottom of the distribution, however, hourly
wages of approximately 1.8 million workers still remained below the legal wage
floor at the end of the first quarter of 2016 compared to 2.8 million before the
reform. As such, the cross-sectional analysis paints an ambivalent picture, with
substantial wage gains for many in the low-income segments of the distribution,
but also with a large number of workers for whom compliance remains an issue.
As a complement to the cross-sectional analysis, the panel allowed for an
investigation of individual wage growth and mobility. Particularly high growth
rates in the bottom decile of the distribution indicate that very low wages rep-
resent a transitory phenomenon for many workers. This group tends to consist
of young workers with short employment biographies, who gain experience and
quickly transition into higher wage segments. The panel analysis further finds
that workers earning below the minimum wage before the introduction had a
higher probability of transitioning into higher wage segments than had been
the case in previous years: the probability of transitioning into the segment
between e8.50 and e10.50 increased by 10 percentage points and the probab-
ility of transitioning into a job paying over e12.00 increased by 7.5 percentage
points. Meanwhile, the probability of this group to leave employment decreased
by 6 percentage points and the probability of the non-employed to take up a job
decreased by 1 percentage point from 2014 to 2016 compared to 2012–2014.
Moving beyond the description of trends to the causal analysis, we employ
a DTADD strategy to establish the extent to which increases in wages and earn-
ings can be ascribed to the reform of 2015. We find that the minimum wage
introduction can account for hourly wage growth in the order of 6.47 percent-
age points, or e0.50/hour more than would have otherwise been the case for
the treatment group of individuals earning below e8.50/hour before the reform.
Further, we examine whether the positive impact on hourly wages translated
into an improvement of the earnings position of low-wage workers in terms of
gross monthly earnings. The analysis yields a positive and marginally significant
treatment effect on monthly earnings of 6.6 percentage points, ore54/month.
Subgroup analysis according to type of employment (socially insured vs.
marginally employed) revealed that the minimum wage had the highest posit-
ive impact on the wages of marginal workers, who experienced a 15.5 percentage
points higher growth rate on account of the reform, followed by the full-time reg-
ularly employed with an additional increase in hourly wages of 7.8 percentage
points. Despite positive treatment effects for hourly wages in both of these groups,
however, no impact of the minimum wage reform on monthly earnings could
be detected when estimating the effect for these groups separately. The absence
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of an effect may be attributed to a reduction in power (small sample size) after
partitioning the sample into the socially insured and marginally employed.
The introduction of the statutory minimum wage in Germany presents a sub-
stantial intervention into the labor market. This paper investigated its short-term
impacts on the wage and earnings distribution, accounting for detectable effects
through the second quarter of 2016. Evaluations of minimum wages in other
countries have established that the full implementation of national, statutory
minimum wages tend to experience a delay due to lags in wage and salary policy
responses or adjustments to production processes of employers and/or time
needed to clarify legal details. Therefore, continued evaluation of the medium
to long-run effects will prove indispensable for understanding the full impact
of the reform. Going forward, it remains to be seen whether the positive treat-
ment effect will persist or even grow over time and whether the compliance gap
will close, for instance due to stronger sanctions for non-compliance or to social
pressure. More compliance, on the other hand, could induce stronger negative
employment effects, which would carry further repercussions for the wage dis-
tribution. Moreover, it is likely that the relatively favorable business cycle that
accompanied the introduction prevented a larger negative employment reaction.
This situation may change if faced with a future recession. Finally, substitution
effects in the medium run cannot be ruled out. It is possible that firms begin
to favor workers exempted from the minimum wage or that they alter their pro-
duction processes to outsource work packages abroad or to the self-employed in
order to cut costs. All of these adjustments could influence the long-run income
distribution in Germany.
Future research could furthermore consider whether the increase in the ini-
tial minimum wage level to e8.84/hour on January 1, 2017 or the end of the
transition period for exempted economic sectors on December 31, 2017 affected
wages, earnings and employment. Both of these changes influence the number
of people on the labor market with the legal right to a higher wage. Lastly, more
research is needed to understand the adjustment mechanisms used by employ-
ers to cope with the additional costs of higher wages. Possible channels include,
but are not limited to: higher production expectations towardworkers, passing on
the costs to consumers through higher prices, or decreasing extra payments and
non-monetary fringe benefits of workers.
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